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ABSTRACT  
What caused the decline of the beef jerky’s production in Brazil? The main sustenance 
for slaves, beef jerky was the most important industry in southern Brazil. Nevertheless, 
by 1850, producers were already worried that they could not compete with Uruguayan 
industry. Traditional interpretations impute the decline to labor markets differences in 
productivity, since Brazil used slaves while Uruguay had abolished slavery in 1842. 
Recent research also raises the possibility of a Brazilian “Dutch Disease”, resulting 
from the coffee exports boom. We test both hypothesis and argue that Brazilian 
production’s decline was associated with structural changes in demand for low quality 
meat. Trade protection policies created disincentives for Brazilian producers to increase 
productivity and diversify its cattle industry. 
Keywords: Beef Jerky, Brazil, Regional Development. 
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RESUMO 
Qual a causa do declínio da produção do charque no Brasil? Principal alimento dos 
escravos, o charque foi a mais importante indústria do sul do Brasil. No entanto, em 
1850, produtores se preocupavam porque não conseguiam competir com a indústria do 
Uruguai. Interpretações tradicionais relacionam o declínio a diferenças de produtividade 
no mercado de trabalho, uma vez que o Brasil utilizava escravos e o Uruguai havia 
abolido a escravidão em 1842. Pesquisas recentes levantam a possibilidade de uma 
“doença holandesa” brasileira, resultante do aumento das exportações do café. Ambas 
as hipóteses são testadas e argumentamos que o declínio da produção brasileira estava 
associado a mudanças estruturais na demanda por carne de baixa qualidade. Políticas de 
proteção comercial criaram desincentivos para que os produtores brasileiros 
aumentassem a produtividade e diversificassem sua produção. 
Palavras-chave: Charque, Brasil, Desenvolvimento Regional.  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 Cattle industry was the most important economic activity in southern Brazil 
during the nineteenth century. Beef jerky (charque) provided the main nourishment for 
the slave labor in coffee and sugar cane plantations and, between 1845 and 1889, along 
with hides, represented on average 70.5% of Rio Grande do Sul province exports (FEE 
2004). Nevertheless, after the 1850’s, for the cattle ranchers and beef jerky exporters the 
local economy couldn’t compete with the Uruguayan production (Cardoso 2003, p.204; 
Bell, 1998, p.79). Having the largest slave population in the Americas after 1850, why 
did the Brazilian industry was lagging behind? 
 Traditional interpretations about the lack of competitiveness were attributed to 
labor markets. Productivities’ differences between slave labor in Brazil and wage labor 
in Uruguay, alongside rising slave prices after the end of the transatlantic slave trade in 
1850, were the explanations as why production in Rio Grande do Sul was losing its 
market share. However, Monasterio (2005) refuted the hypothesis that the use of slave 
labor was irrational and argued that captives represented a lower cost than wage labor 
for the beef jerky production. Monasterio also raised an alternative hypothesis, in which 
the coffee export boom damaged the southern industry through a “Dutch Disease”: the 
real exchange rate appreciation caused by the soaring coffee exports raised Brazilian 
charque prices, making them less competitive against foreign competition. 
 Rio Grande do Sul is located at the Uruguayan border and both regions have 
similar geographical endowments. These regions also shared similar transports costs to 
the Brazilian main markets of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. Since Brazil did not have 
integrated coastal railways, transport had to be made by mules or by coastal ships 
(Summerhill 2003). This paper argues that production costs, represented by the price of 
the slave labor, were not responsible for the beef jerky industry’s decline. Brazilian 
exchange rate appreciation had a short term impact on Rio Grande do Sul industry’s 
competitiveness, but quantitative analysis shows that it cannot be use as a long-run 
explanation for the sector’s decline. The answer to understand Brazilian industry’s 
situation is to look at structural changes in meat production at the other side of the 
border, which resulted from an increase in demand for products with higher quality than 
beef jerky.  
 The increased integration of Latin America into the world economy at the 
second half of the nineteenth century is well known (O’Rourke; Williamson 1999), but 
the impact of the first globalization on peripheral industries remains an open topic. 
Uruguay’s growth came not primarily through an increase in beef jerky to Brazil, but 
through a diversification of its exports. Regional military conflicts, especially the 
Paraguayan War (1864 – 1870), led to an increased demand for products that could be 
conditioned, such as canned beef. Also, shifting external demands, especially from 
European markets, dictated the production of a country that did not have substantial 
internal markets for its products. Brazilian producers, however, received a different set 
of incentives. With tariff protection offered by the government and a guaranteed market 
for their product, the Brazilian southern beef jerky industry did not have incentives to 
change their production for high quality meats, where they would face global 
competition. Brazilian low wages would make high quality meat production 
unprofitable if the producers relied only on internal markets. Another important aspect 
for the different paths taken by the Uruguayan and the Brazilian cattle industry regards 
the supply of new technology. Uruguay’s modernization was built with British foreign 
capital. Southern Brazil, in the absence of foreign investments, lacked access to 
financial institutions that could make a modernization possible. 
2.  BEEF JERKY EXPORTS IN RIO GRANDE DO SUL 
 The Pampas, a biome that covers the south of Rio Grande do Sul and all 
Uruguay, was an appropriate place for cattle herding and beef jerky production. The 
border proximity between cattle farms in Uruguay and Rio Grande do Sul can be stated 
from a statistic provided by the Province’s Presidential Report from 1858. According to 
the President Silva Ferraz, in 1857, 81.427 cattle entered the Province from Uruguay, 
while 103.635 crossed the border on the opposite direction. This represents an intense 
livestock movement, since for the same year, 40.279 cattle were used for meat 
consumption (carne verde) and 365.508 animals were used to produce beef jerky 
(Provincial Presidential Report, 1857, p.35).1
                                                             
1 From the same Report, each animal resulted in 4 arrobas of beef jerky.  
 Regarding beef jerky production in Rio 
Grande do Sul, as can be seen in table 1, the majority of exports went to other ports in 
Brazil, such as Rio de Janeiro and Pernambuco, to feed slaves that worked at the coffee 
and sugar cane plantations. Exports to ports in Europe, as Spain, Italy and Portugal, 
represented a small part of production.2
Table 1: Destination of Rio Grande do Sul Beef Jerky Exports (arrobas) 
  
Year Ports in Brazil Uruguay Ports in Europe 
1847 2.404.104 336 152.325 
1848 2.362.031 3425 80.153 
1849 2.093.996 346 25.116 
1850 1.838.131 248 2.575 
1851 1.907.717 0 0 
1852 1.492:744 0 0 
1853 1.754.015 0 11 
1854 1.397.621 0 5.916 
1855 1.170.983 0 0 
1856 1.229.089 0 0 
Source: Provincial Presidential Reports, Rio Grande do Sul (several years) 
 Notwithstanding the complaints from local producers quoted by Cardoso (2003) 
and Bell (1998), two major political conflicts benefited Rio Grande do Sul’s beef jerky 
industry at the beginning of the 1850’s. The first came from the end of the Farroupilha 
civil war (1835–1845), which occurred as a result of claims from unfair external 
competition. The revolutionaries, associated with the Brazilian cattle industry, criticized 
the high customhouse’s taxes applied to their product, while the products from Uruguay 
and Argentina were exempt from taxes (Padoin 2006). As an agreement to end the 
conflict, the Imperial government taxed imports of foreign beef jerky at 25 percent 
(Pesavento 1980). 
 Despite the raise in taxes, in 1851, the legislative assembly of Rio Grande do Sul 
urged the Emperor to raise taxes again on foreign beef jerky, to 40 percent. Their 
argument was that the taxes on salt, used extendedly on beef jerky and tannery 
production, made the local production uncompetitive (Correio Mercantil… 1851a p.2). 
Since the tax on salt, of 30 percent, was an important source of revenue, the government 
was not receptive to the idea. Also, the demand for an increased tax on foreign beef 
jerky conflicted directly with plantation owners that used slave labor. In an editorial 
called “the demands of southern friends”, published at a Rio de Janeiro’s newspaper, 
                                                             
2 It should be noted that the discrepancy between data from table 1 and the series in graph 1 is due to the 
figures in the latter regards the values declared by the tree most important custom houses, Porto Alegre, 
Rio Grande and São José do Norte, and do not represent all the province production. 
beef jerky producers were criticized for the demands that would raise agricultural 
production costs on other provinces (Correio Mercantil…, 1851b p.1). 
 Given the conflict of interest between provinces, it’s fairly common to find in 
contemporary southern newspapers texts regarding the need to diversify Rio Grande do 
Sul’s industry. In 1851, the “Rio-Grandense” newspaper called for a change in meat 
production. Since city of Rio Grande port was frequented by “hundreds of foreign 
vessels” and foreigners were not “accustomed to beef jerky”, the province was losing 
economic opportunities by focusing in a production that consumed an “insane amount 
of work”, which required a lot of slaves for all the processes required to prepare the 
product (O Rio-Grandense, 1851, p.3).  
 While worries increased in Rio Grande do Sul about its main export product, 
another regional conflict gave a renewed advantage to the Brazilian beef jerky. The 
conflict that benefited Brazilian exporters was Uruguay’s Guerra Grande (1839 – 
1852), between Blanco and Colorado political parties, which disorganize the Uruguayan 
industry (Bell 1993). Despite a reduction in Rio Grande do Sul cattle supply during the 
conflict, due to herds apprehensions from the Uruguayan government and an increase in 
livestock mortality (Farinatti 2008), Brazilian cattlemen benefited from an almost 
complete stop in the Uruguayan production.   
 The end of the war was achieved with Brazilian support, which offered 
protection against new assaults from the argentine commander J.M de Rosas. 
Debilitated by several years of conflicts, Uruguay had to accept the Brazilian 
government demands at the postwar treaty in 1851, including Montevideo’s occupation 
by the Imperial army in 1853 (Souza; Prado, 2002). According to Santos (1987, p.41), 
to increase Uruguay’s dependence to its protectorate, the Imperial government had also 
the objective to impair the cattle industry from its neighbor. The treaty raised import 
taxes even more, enhanced property rights for the Brazilian estancieiros that had lands 
across de border and established that Uruguayan cattle would not pay taxes to enter 
Brazilian territory, offering a cheap cattle supply to the Brazilian beef jerky (Pesavento, 
1980a, p. 29). The country’s border with Brazil was taken as an “Imperial economic and 
social appendix”, with a great number of Brazilian cattle ranchers, that used slave labor 
regardless of the Uruguayan abolition in 1842 (Souza; Prado, 2002, p.2). 
 The beneficiary impact of the Imperial government politics for the beef jerky 
production in Rio Grande do Sul is clear from Graph 1, which shows a steady increase 
in exports after 1851. Until the end of the Paraguayan War, in March 1870, the 
Brazilian beef jerky benefited from its protectionist advantage over Uruguayan 
production. It’s important to note that the sharp drop in exports shown in 1869, 
according to the Province’s President Israel Rodrigues Barcellos, was due to heavy rains 
that destroyed major roads leading to places of cattle slaughter (Provincial Presidential 
Report, 1869, p.5). Since beef jerky production sites were located in cities near the east 
coast, such as Pelotas, and cattle were raised in cities at the border of Uruguay, a 
disruption on the roads could paralyze production. Also, in 1870, pastures in Rio 
Grande do Sul were ravaged by a foreign herb (epazote) that had already caused damage 
in Uruguay and Argentina (Diário do Rio de Janeiro 1870, ed. 167 p.2). From the beef 
jerky exports data, the industry’s stagnation began after 1870. In 1872, the city of Rio 
Grande Business Association financed some studies to understand the problems of its 
industry (Cardoso 2003, p.214). Again, taxes were to blame for the lack of 
competitiveness.  
Graph 1: Rio Grande do Sul Beef Jerky Exports (tons)  
 
Source: FEE (2004) 
 However, even in the 1860s, a decade with increasing growth in exports, Rio 
Grande do Sul production lagged behind when compared to Uruguay. According to a 
commercial Rio de Janeiro newspaper, in 1865 there was some concern regarding the 
quality of Rio Grande do Sul beef jerky. The Rio de la Plata product was preferred and 
had “taken over the markets of Rio de Janeiro” (Diário do Rio de Janeiro 1865, ed.8 
p.3). The Brazilian beef jerky still had a better market share in Bahia but the article 
stated that it was also facing increasing competition from Uruguay. Using data from Rio 
de Janeiro newspapers, it’s clear that despite similar prices, during the 1860’s 
Uruguay’s beef jerky already dominated the most important Brazilian market. The 
information in Table 2 presents data with prices (réis) and beef jerky stocks (arrobas) 
from newspapers at the first week of each year presented. This should not be interpreted 
as an average price for the whole year but gives information to differences in prices 
from both regions. Using data from the beginning of each year also makes it possible to 
compare the stocks available for each product at the end of the previous year. 
Table 2: Prices and stocks of Beef Jerky in Rio de Janeiro 
 
Rio Grande do 
Sul (RS) 
 
Rio de la Plata 
(URU) 
 
R.Grande 
Stock 
Uruguay 
Stock 
Year Min Max Average Min Max Average 
  1860 3.000 4.500 3.750 3.200 4.600 3.900 
  1861 1.600 4.500 3.050 3.000 3.200 3.100 
  1862 2.000 3.000 2.500 2.500 3.200 2.850 
  1863 3.000 3.200 3.100 1.800 3.600 2.700 11.300 120.492 
1864 1.000 2.600 1.800 1.500 2.600 2.050 32.120 187.281 
1865 800 2.000 1.400 800 3.000 1.900 37.837 231.200 
1866 600 2.100 1.350 1.200 2.200 1.700 33.700 208.071 
1867 2.800 3.400 3.100 2.800 4.000 3.400 13.800 204.225 
1868 1.600 2.400 2.000 1.800 3.200 2.500 19.500 180.500 
1869 3.600 3.600 3.600 3.000 4.600 3.800 7.000 53.600 
1870 1.500 5.000 3.250 2.000 4.000 3.000 
 
  
1871 2.000 5.000 3.500 3.000 4.600 3.800 
  1872 3.800 3.800 3.800 3.400 4.000 3.700 
  Source: Diário do Rio de Janeiro – Biblioteca Nacional Digital (Several Years) 
 After the beginning of the 1870’s, the Law of Free Birth (Ventre Livre) 
terminated the last source of slave supply and posed a new limit to the increase in beef 
jerky production (Bethell, 1970). An increase in demand was unlikely with the slave 
population decline throughout the country, approximately 45 percent in coffee 
plantation areas between 1872 and 1887 (Luna; Klein, 2010, p.320). Immigrants that 
were replacing slave labor did not consume dried meat (Holloway 1980). After the end 
of slavery in Brazil, in 1888, beef jerky production continued its slow decay. However, 
at the beginning of the twentieth century, the sector remained relevant at the regional 
level. In 1909, Álvaro Baptista, finance minister of Rio Grande do Sul, deplored the 
inability of the region to move away from an industry that would inevitably disappear 
(Fonseca 1983).  
 
3. MEAT EXPORTS IN URUGUAY 
 The political and economic disorganization of Uruguay, the result of constant 
wars and bad commercial treatises, came to a halt in 1856 (Rock, 2000). From that 
period until 1865, Blanco and Colorado’s head politicians tried to come together in 
order to create a national awareness and condemn the perjury from past existing 
connections between both parties and inimical foreign countries (Casal 2004). However, 
with or without political conflicts, Uruguay’s economy was heavily reliant on 
international trade (Barran; Nahum, 1984). Different from Rio Grande do Sul, which 
had a large market in other Brazilian provinces, Uruguay depended on foreign markets. 
 After 1860, due to the 1851 treaty and changes in global demand, the beef jerky 
started losing its relevance in Uruguayan exports. Also, as a consequence of the United 
States Civil war (1861–1865), Uruguayan exporters had the possibility to diversify and 
increase its wool production, since the country was one of few regions in the world 
where bovine and ovine cattle shared the same territory. United States was the main 
cotton supplier to Europe’s textile industry and faced an abrupt fall in production during 
the war years, leading to a rise in cotton demand from other regions and also for 
substitutes, such as wool (Barran; Nahum 1984).  
 Within a decade (1860-1870), the wool industry established itself as one of 
major economic activities in Uruguay, enabling the rise of medium size estancieiros and 
giving ovine’s a more important position in cattle raising. Cattle diversification, 
however, did not happen for Brazilian estancieiros located north of the Rio Negro River 
(Farinatti 2008, p.103). As the treatises guaranteed better gains from selling bovine 
cattle, they kept extensive breeding for the beef jerky industry in Rio Grande do Sul. 
The good economic scenario resulting from wool exports lasted until the end of the 
North American conflict. With markets normalization after the war, and the United 
States protectionist tariff against foreign wool (Morrill tariff), Uruguayan wool sector 
lost a great share of its market. In the 1870’s, according to a contemporary writer, 
higher land prices and wages represented the end of easy money for sheep farmers 
(Burton 1870, p.88).  
 The profits from Uruguay’s prosperity years led to the perception in the 
literature that, beginning in 1860, estancias acquired a modern vision, with innovative 
technologies coming from social groups with a “clear capitalist project” (Minello 1977, 
p.578). Nevertheless, that capitalist project seems to have come from a greater 
availability of resources from the 1860’s economic boom, as the increased need for 
leather and wool offered incentives to invest in steam machinery to draw grease out of 
the animals and improve productivity.   
 An example of the shift in market demand came in 1862, with the first meat 
extract factory in the Prata Region, established by a Belgian company. Located in the 
city of Fray Bentos, in a place previously used as a saladero, the factory was sold to a 
British company in 1866, giving birth to the “Liebig’s Extract of Meat Company”. 
Anglo-Irish traveler Thomas J. Hutchinson visited the factory in 1867, and his first 
impression refers to the unlikeness to others saladeros he had been to: “the general 
atmosphere, about the engine-house particularly, being suggestive of rich beef-gravy” 
(Hutchinson, 1868, p.411). Hutchinson reports that each animal produced 10 pounds 
(4,5kg) of meat extract and that during his visit in March 1867, the factory had the 
capacity to produce 250 pounds (114kg) per day. Despite the amount, the production 
was still insufficient to European demands, which was four times greater (Hutchinson, 
1868, p.412).  
Another writer who visited Liebig was the Italian Antonio Gallenga. In the book 
that registered his voyage through South America, he describes the “famous” English 
company and its £500.000 capital. According to the author, during the summer months, 
when the cattle was heavier, herds would arrive through great distances, sometimes 
more than 100 miles, and a thousand would be slaughtered per day on average. With 
550 employees, mainly Bascos, the factory slaughtered around 80 animals per hour, and 
“nothing was wasted”. Gallenga mentions estimatives about Liebig’s revenue, which 
had annual profits of £81.000, using 6000 tons of coal and around 128.000 pounds of 
salt (Gallenga, 1880, p.300). The cleanness at Liebig in comparison to other saladeros, 
also cited by Hutchinson, is clear in Gallengas description of a common saladero  
administered by a Brazilian. According to the description, after visiting the 
slaughterhouse escorted by his host family – and surprised that no one bothered about 
the amount of blood and animal remains in the area - “we went back to the breakfast-
room, the dwelling-house being so close to the saladero that the flies would not have 
allowed us to eat in peace for one moment” (Gallenga, 1880, p.301). 
 Infrastructural information shows the importance of meat extract to Uruguay’s 
exports. Not only for its added value and the possibility to be shipped to distant markets, 
but also because the country had been diversifying its exports products and delegating 
beef jerky a smaller role.3
 Brazil used border areas as a base for war operations and its monthly subsidy to 
its Oriental Division caused a rapid economic expansion in Uruguay from 1865 to 1868: 
“The incoming gold allowed Montevideo entrepreneurs to establish new navigation, 
railroad, telegraph, and building companies as well as new steam factories, new banks, 
credit brokers, and even mining operations” (Casal, 2004, p.137). The artificial growth 
increased livestock and meat extract sales, causing land and cattle prices to rise. The 
high profit rates led banks to increase credit lines, making possible investments on the 
first meat refrigerated storages. Growth came to a sudden stop only in 1868, when the 
inflow of Brazilian gold ended as the war drew to a close (Casal 2004). 
 This trend was reinforced by another regional conflict. Even 
with the good economic conditions and no political conflicts after the pact between 
Blancos and Colorados in 1856, confrontation among parties resurged as the result of 
geopolitical tension in the region that led to Paraguayan War. Once more, Brazil 
interfered in Uruguayan territory, giving support to Colorado’s party president 
Venancio Flores against the Blanco party, which had the support of the Paraguayan 
Marshal Solano López. One important reason for the Brazilian intervention was the 
constant territorial dispute in the region, which had several Brazilian cattle ranchers. 
With Argentina and Paraguay supporting different parties, Brazil had to make a 
statement, and sent in terrestrial forces commanded by the Baron of Tamandaré (Casal 
2004).  
 Despite the increase in production during the Paraguayan War, Uruguay did not 
increase its bovine meat supply to external markets because low quality meat had only 
limited demand internationally. The European consumer, especially the British, rejected 
beef jerky (Minello, 1977, p. 580). Seen as food for slaves in Brazil and Cuba, accounts 
report that “its appearance to Europeans [was] absolutely offensive” (Newcastle 
Courant, Sep, 1866, p.3). According to contemporaneous newspapers:  
 “Some five hundred or six hundred different experiments have been 
made to cure South American beef so as to make it a marketable article 
in Europe; but no real success has as yet attended the efforts. The meat 
[charque] as forwarded has been refused by the working classes in 
England, and rejected by the French navy…” (Dublin Evening Mail, Jun 
1869).  
                                                             
3 Nevertheless, the meat extract still did not have the same appeal as fresh meat; “[…] except for the war 
years, when a large demand for this kind of meat (canned and tasajo) for the armies existed, the exports 
have been small. The canning plants must give way, as the cattle industry improves, to the modern 
packing plants which turn out the higher grades of meat” (Jones, 1927, p.366).  
 
 Before refrigeration, the second half of the nineteenth century witnessed several 
attempts to transport meat from South America to Europe that didn’t involve dried 
salted beef. Besides Baron Liebig’s meat extract, used in military endeavors and in 
European hospitals, other methods tried to preserve the meat as raw as possible. One of 
them, called Sloper’s process, packet the meat in tins and preserve it by the introduction 
of “a certain gas the composition of which is kept a profound secret”. There were also 
methods that involved “forced infiltration of brine into all the tissues of the animal 
immediately after death”, from the Liverpool Company based on Uruguay called the 
Morgan Patent Meat Preserving Company. Also, the Pharmaceutical Society of London 
developed a process with consisted in the immersion of fresh meat in melted paraffin 
(Newcastle Courant, Sep 14, 1866 p.3). Using data from the British government ledgers 
of imports, Graph 2 shows the increase in meat exports after 1870 from Uruguay that 
didn’t involve salting. Millot and Bertino (1996 p.170) also show that meat industry in 
Uruguay increased steadily after 1875 until the end of the century.  
Graph 2: Uruguay’s exports of preserved meat otherwise than by salting, 1850-
1889 (cwt). 
 
Source: Ledgers of Imports under Countries (CUST 4), British National   
 Archives. 
 The increase in demand for non salted meat in Europe did not affect only the 
Plata region. By the end of the 1860’s, refrigerated meat was shipped across the United 
States and had begun to reach European markets (Timmons, 2005; Wade 2003). 
According to a weekly gazette from 1866, the business of hermetically sealed packing 
for meats and vegetables was flourishing in states like Maine (Bath Chronicle and 
Weekly Gazette, Sep, 1866). The productivity increase in the North American 
production, achieved through a series of laborsaving devices, sought to take advantage 
of all the cattle parts. From this, “jerked beef” produced in Chicago was sold to West 
Indies’ slaves from previously disposable parts, such as necks and shanks (Wade 2003 
p.8). Just as the United States production, it seems that Brazil after the 1870’s became 
only a destination for Uruguayan low-quality meat, what was left of production to 
European markets.4
 Bovine cattle increase in Uruguay between 1852 and 1900 was approximately 
370% - a live stock of 1.800.000 to 6.800.000 - whereas the growth in ovine cattle was 
of 2330%, from 796.000 to 18.608.000 (Jones 1927). The production of low quality 
meat reduced during the years. From 1921 to 1923, for example, beef jerky represented 
only 5% of the countries commodities export (Jones 1927), meanwhile for Rio Grande 
do Sul, the average was 20,8% (FEE 2002). Higher quality meat, such as refrigerated  
(7%), frozen (14%) and canned (7%) left beef jerky behind as a displaced product in the 
Uruguayan Republic (Finch 2005). On the other hand, Rio Grande do Sul exported only 
0,33% of canned meat and 5,33% of packed meat. The backwardness can be verified by 
comparing the dates in which packinghouses were established in both regions: 
Frigorifica Uruguai, in 1905, and the first in Rio Grande do Sul, in 1918 (Jones, 1927). 
 According to Millot and Bertino (1996 p.169), beef jerky’s industry 
in Uruguay peaked in 1863, when other industries involving cattle began to rise.   
4. INTERPRETATIONS FOR THE BRAZILIAN INDUSTRY’S DECLINE  
 Despite differences in fiscal incentives and access to foreign capital between Rio 
Grande do Sul and Uruguay, characterization of slave labor as “noneconomic” remains 
an important explanation for why Rio Grande do Sul could not compete with Uruguay, 
which increasingly used free labor after the 1840’s (Borucki et al 2004). The use of a 
less productive labor force, the “irrationality hypothesis”, was defended by several 
authors, such as Corsetti (1983), Cardoso (2003) and Pesavento (1980). Authors such as 
Décio Freitas (1980, p.35), argued that nothing could be more anti-economic than slave 
labor. There are two usual reasons for this kind of argument: restricted labor division 
resulted in lower productivity; and the necessity of constant vigilance represented 
higher costs than free labor. Also, flexibility in wage labor markets presented the 
possibility to reduce the workforce in economic slowdowns (Cardoso 2003). 
                                                             
4 According to Hutchinson (1868): “Only in Brazil and Cuba, where it is bought on account of its 
cheapness to feed the slaves, has this charqui ever been a marketable article.”   
Costs became increasingly important after the 1860’s, when according to 
Pesavento (1980), the saladero platino began to modernize its industry. The rising slave 
prices after the end of the slave trade in 1850 represented an important increment in 
costs for the Brazilian production, as can be seen in graph 3, with the prices of male 
slaves, between 20 and 29 years old, that worked at beef jerky production sites in Rio 
Grande do Sul. With the sudden stop in labor supply, European immigration policies 
became one of the main concerns for Brazilian politicians (Carvalho, 2003; Skidmore, 
1974). Contemporary authors, as the Italian researcher G. B. Marchesini stated that the 
“recent experience” with foreigner labor in Brazil made clear that the “free labor [was] 
more productive in any culture” (Marchesini, 1877, p.76).5
Graph 3: Average Male Slave Prices (Mil-Reis) 
  
 
Source: State of Rio Grande do Sul Archive. 
The view of slave labor as necessarily less productive than free labor remained 
practically uncontested until the work of Conrad and Meyers (1958). Afterwards, Fogel 
and Engerman (1989) also provided evidence that captive labor had been even more 
productive than wage labor in some circumstances, and that the reason for slave use in 
the United States southern plantations was economic, not only cultural. For Brazil, 
Mello (1978) and Versiani (1994) also raised questions about captive labor economic 
inferiority despite the absence of data to compare all labor costs related to free labor, 
                                                             
5 Many contemporary Brazilian authors and politicians quoted European authors such as Adam Smith 
about the benefits of free labor: “The experience of all ages and nations, I believe, demonstrates that the 
work done by slaves, though it appears to cost only their maintenance, is in the end the dearest of any. A 
person who can acquire no property, can have no other interest but to eat as much, and to labour as little 
as possible” (Smith, 2007, p.252). 
mainly represented by immigrants. By the end of the 1870’s, Rio Grande do Sul already 
had a strong presence of foreigners, not only at agricultural colonies but also in urban 
areas (Trento, 1989). Nevertheless, the only connection they had with the beef jerky’s 
industry was through the production and selling of hides to external markets.6
 Monasterio (2005) also provides evidence that slave use at the charqueadas was 
rational and represented a lower cost than free labor. He makes reference to attempts to 
introduce the “platine system” in Rio Grande do Sul, without success. During the 
Paraguayan War, there are records of attempts to send prisoners and Paraguayan 
children to work at the saladeros, to lower industry’s wages (Casal, 2004, p.131-35). 
Another indicative of the high costs of wages in Uruguay’s saladeros occurred with the 
end, in 1861, of the Commerce Treaty with Brazil due to protests of unfair competition 
by President Bernardo Berro. The president prohibited work long term contracts 
between Brazilian and “citizens of color”, because the possibility of slave use, which 
“represented half of the wages from a Uruguayan rural worker” (Souza; Prado, 2002, 
p.16). 
 Slaves 
still were largely used on the most prosperous economic regions of Rio Grande do Sul: 
“the charqueadores, which were supposed to be the more ardent defenders of abolition, 
remained proslavery until the end” (Cardoso, 2003, p.257). 
Another important cost regarding the charque industry was the possibility of 
revolts and runaways, because production sites and the cattle herding region 
(campanha) were near the Uruguayan border, where slavery was illegal. The proximity 
led authors such as Luiz Targa and Décio Freitas to assert that slave use was not 
possible at the cattle herd region (Nogueról et al, 2007, p.13). However, Versiani (1994) 
showed that slaves responded to a series of positive incentives, which were used to 
increase productivity and prevent runaways in frontier regions. Nogueról et al (2007) 
also presents evidence that slaves used horses on the open fields of Rio Grande do Sul 
on a regular basis, and some were even horse tamers. One of the negative incentives for 
runaways was Uruguay’s responsibility – from the 1851 treaty – to return any black 
individual suspect of been a runaway slave. Also, a large part of the Uruguayan border 
was controlled by Brazilians ranchers (Souza, 2002, p.13). 
 Despite the focus on the limitations in using slave labor, the literature did not 
deny the possibility for specialization. Using reports of contemporaries that visited the 
                                                             
6 Quadro Estatístico e Geográfico da Província de S. Pedro do Rio Grande do Sul, p.81, 1868. Available 
at FEE. 
charqueadas in the nineteenth century, there were descriptions of labor division 
(Cardoso, 2003, p.178). Marcondes (2009) recently showed that between 1873 and 
1875, in cities related to cattle ranching in Rio Grande do Sul, slaves were used in 
several occupations, with an ample division of labor.7 The new database used in this 
paper also provides evidence that, between 1850 and 1884, there has been labor division 
at the charqueadas. From the 637 male and healthy slaves’ sample, half of them (319) 
had declared an occupation. Also, data from the inventory of businessman José Inácio 
da Cunha, from 1865, shows that his 115 slaves had seventeen different occupations at 
the charqueada.8
 Labor division along a “production line”, with slaves that killed the herds, others 
that cleaned the animals and others that salted the meat, points to a division of labor 
similar to a free workforce system. Nogueról et al (2007) noticed that slaves with 
declared occupation at post-mortem inventories, after 1850, had on average 15 per cent 
higher selling prices. There was a perception by slave owners about productivity 
differentials among captives. Brazilian historiography also provides ample evidence that 
slave labor specialization included even complex tasks, which demanded special 
training (Schwartz 1988; Luna, Klein 2011). 
 Women were also divided along different occupations, such as cook, 
farmhand, laundress, seamstress, among others. 
 Another recent hypothesis concerning the Brazilian beef jerky’s decline is from 
Monasterio (2005). He raises the possibility of a "Dutch Disease" phenomenon, where a 
boom in the export sector affects other sectors subject to international competition. In 
the charqueadas’ case, the expansion of coffee production drove demand for non 
tradable products which resulted in inflation. Hence, the reduction in the 
competitiveness of Brazilian beef jerky would occur through the appreciation of the real 
exchange rate. Graph 4, which presents a real exchange rate series for Brazil, provides 
evidence that there were currency appreciation after 1850, when coffee exports began to 
growth at a faster rate.  
 
 
                                                             
7 The cities were Dom Pedrito, Encruzilhada and Rio Pardo. 
8 Inventory nº 600, maço 39. APERS. The activities are: Campeiro, graxeiro, pedreiro, servente, balieiro, 
carneador, lavadeiro, tripeiro, carroceiro, sebeiro, tanoeiro, salgador, marinheiro, descarneador, 
cozinheiro, carpinteiro e roceiro. 
Graph 4: Real Exchange Rate (1850 = 100) 
 
Source: Moura Filho (2006); Twigger (1999); Lobo (1971) 
 Comparing the literature on the subject for Brazil and Uruguay, it is interesting 
to note that the beef jerky industry’s decline after 1870 appears on both countries, as 
Finch (2005) and Millot and Bertino (1996) argued for Uruguay. Uruguayan 
historiography even raises the possibility of a "resource curse" due to its inability to 
compete in the meat market with countries with similar characteristics, such as New 
Zealand.9
 On the next section, we provide quantitative analysis on the two hypothesis 
raised for the Rio Grande do Sul industry. Analyzing the impact of the exchange rate 
and labor costs on prices and quantity exported can contribute to the debate by changing 
the variables of interest. The quantity exported, shown in graph 1, presents evidence 
that exports did not decline, but stagnated after 1870 from an early period of high 
protection. The industry’s decline at the beginning of the twentieth century can only be 
understood with the end of slavery, which terminated the main consumers. After that, 
only a fraction of the poorest population continued to consume salted dried meat.  
 According to authors that support this hypothesis, the good pastures from the 
Pampas promoted inertia. With less risk, investments made in the Uruguayan cattle 
received smaller profits, but it kept the industry working (Barrán; Nahum 1984, p.670).  
 
                                                             
9 According to Barrán and Nahum: the British colonists were forced to respond to the challenge presented 
by the rugged and wooded territory of New Zealand. From the start, in the first half of the nineteenth 
century, they sowed pastureland. Uruguay, as has already been stated, had the diabolical blessing of ease. 
Its natural pastures did not necessitate the invention of the soil; it was already there (p.670, 1984). 
3. LABOR MARKETS OR DUTCH DISEASE? 
In this session we test the different hypothesis presented previously for the 
causes of the beef jerky industry decline. The sample begins in 1837, right before the 
beginning of the Farropilha civil war, and goes until the de facto abolition of slavery in 
Rio Grande do Sul, in 1884. The variables used are quantity (in tons) and prices (in mil-
réis) of beef jerky exported (FEE 2004), slave prices, real exchange rate and salt prices 
(IPEA). The inclusion of salt prices refers, as previously stated, that at the beginning of 
the 1850’s there was an argument that taxes on salt made local production 
uncompetitive.  
For the labor market hypothesis, we built a series of slaves’ prices for the three 
main cities associated with beef jerky production: Pelotas, with 1463 observations, Rio 
Grande, with 751, and Porto Alegre, with 1289. These observations refer to slaves 
registers from postmortem inventories, between 1830 and 1884. From this data, we 
selected only healthy males, between 20 and 29 years, that represented the most valued 
and productive labor for the industry. They represent the highest slave prices.10
 Two other series were tested in the empirical analysis but were discarded. The 
first one is Bértola (1998) estimations of the cattle industry in Uruguay. The first 
impediment to use the data is that it begins in 1870, at the latter half of the present 
analysis. The other difficulty is that the estimations do not relate only to beef jerky 
production and, as will be demonstrated at the next section, Uruguay began to 
increasingly diversify its exports away from beef jerky after 1870. The other series 
tested refers to Brazilian coffee exports, whose labor force represented the main market 
 We 
adjust these prices using Feinstein (1995) consumer price index in silver prices. The 
usual Brazilian price index for the period analyzed is Lobo (1971), which is based on a 
limited basket of consumer goods in Rio de Janeiro. Since slaves represented a 
significant investment for the period analyzed, using Lobo’s price index would distort 
the series due to higher fluctuation from non durable consumer goods. Lobo’s index, 
with the 1919 weighting, is used with the price of beef jerky and salt. Concerning the 
Dutch disease hypothesis, a real exchange rate series, presented in graph 3, is built using 
data from the nominal exchange rate by Moura Filho (2006), together with the price 
level for England from Twigger (1999) and the domestic price level of Lobo (1971), 
which contains beef jerky prices.  
                                                             
10 The data is from the Public Archive of Rio Grande do Sul.  
for beef jerky. The reason this variable was excluded is that is highly correlated with the 
real exchange rate. Also, since annual data is used, the limited number of observations 
requires a certain restrain in the number of parameters to be estimated. Other 
information that should be noted comes from graph 5. As previously stated, both beef 
jerky and salt prices were deflated using Lobo’s price index. However, as the real 
exchange rate graph also shows, the price index probably distorts the real prices before 
1855.  
Graph 5: Beef Jerky and Salt Prices (Mil-Réis) 
  
Source: FEE (2004), IPEADATA (2014) 
The first step to analyze the relationship between variables is to verify if the 
series are stationary. The appendix presents the results for the unit root tests, which 
show that all variables, expect salt prices, are integrated of order 1. Since the interest of 
the paper relies on analyzing long term processes and not their rates of change, a Vector 
Error Correction model (VECM) is used to accommodate the nonstationary features of 
the data. To test for the existence of a long-run equilibrium relation between the 
variables, a cointegration analysis using the Johansen procedure is presented in the 
appendix. Given that the series presents strong fluctuations in some specific periods, all 
variables are transformed to their logarithmic form to minimize heteroskedasticity 
issues (Banerjee et al, 2003).  
Using the Johansen procedure, both Maximum Eigenvalue and Trace statistics 
indicate the existence of one cointegration vector for the logarithm of Beef Jerky 
Exports (LQ), Prices (LP), Slave Prices (LS) and real exchange rate (LRER). Since Salt 
Prices (LSA) is stationary, this variable is incorporated as exogenous in the VECM. 
Two exogenous year dummies are also used. One dummy is in 1883 (d1883), related to 
the plunge in prices in anticipation to the local end of slavery. The other is for the year 
1842 (d1842), for the real exchange rate series. Also, to comply with the assumptions of 
the model, the appendix presents statistics for the LM autocorrelation test and normality 
tests for the VECM residuals. The results for the cointegration vectors and its 
adjustment coefficients are presented in table 3.  
Table 3: Vector Error Correction Estimates 
Long Run 
Parameters 
LQ(-1) LP(-1) LRER(-1) LS(-1) Constant 
 1.000 1.190 
[4.54] 
-0.668 
[-1.60] 
0.205 
[0.56] 
-16.709 
Error Correction 
Term 
D(LQ) 
-0.344 
[-3.86] 
D(LP) 
-0.202 
[-1.78] 
D(LRER) 
-0.075 
[-2.93] 
D(LS) 
0.025 
[0.40] 
 
Short Run 
Parameters 
     
D(LQ(-1)) -0.45 
[-3.53] 
0.29 
[1.82] 
-0.04 
[-1.25] 
0.015 
[0.16] 
 
D(LP(-1)) 0.16 
[1.22] 
-0.11 
[-0.64] 
0.03 
[0.82] 
0.05 
[0.55] 
 
D(LRER(-1)) 0.64 
[1.62] 
-0.24 
[-0.48] 
-0.48 
[-4.17] 
0.22 
[0.80] 
 
D(LS(-1)) 0.11 
[0.59] 
-0.007 
[-0.29] 
-0.06 
[-1.12] 
-0.27 
[-2.02] 
 
Constant -0.06 
[-0.04] 
-1.36 
[0.85] 
-0.82 
[-2.26] 
-0.41 
[-0.47] 
 
LSA 0.19 
[0.11] 
0.17 
[0.82] 
0.10 
[2.17] 
0.05 
[0.49] 
 
D1842 0.03 
[0.11] 
-0.38 
[-0.99] 
0.38 
[4.32] 
0.18 
[0.84] 
 
D1883 0.04 
[0.14] 
-0.06 
[-0.17] 
0.07 
[0.86] 
-0.77 
[-3.58] 
 
Adj. R-Squared 0.41 0.24 0.58 0.38  
SSR 3.158 5.109 0.263 1.537  
F-Statistic 5.030 1.503 6.430 2.938  
46 observations, t-statistics in [ ] 
Since the VECM relates to simultaneous representations of a system, its 
individual coefficients do not have a clear interpretation. The primary interest relies on 
the error correction terms, which show if variables adjust in the short run to deviations 
from equilibrium. From table 3, the only variable that does not adjust is Slave Prices. 
The error correction term equals to zero means that this variable is weakly exogenous 
(Burke, Hunter 2005). Also, the long run parameter of the real exchange rate is not 
different from zero, meaning that this variable is exogenous in the long-run.  
From the results, the error correction parameters must be consistent with the 
proposed model. From the three variables that have an error correction term, the Real 
Exchange Rate does not behave in a way as to correct short term deviations.11
Table 4: Variance Decomposition of Quantity and Prices of Beef Jerky Exported 
 The low 
coefficient (-0.07) represents that this variable is acting in a very weak manner against 
adjustment. As expected, quantity and prices are responsible for the adjustment to 
deviations from equilibrium. To better understand the impact between variables we 
present in table 4 results from variance decomposition analysis for five periods. From 
these results, there is no evidence that changes in slave prices had a significant impact 
on the quantity and prices of beef jerky exports. For the real exchange rate, there is 
some small impact on the quantity exported. 
Period LQ LP LRER LS 
Quantity     
1 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2 92.10 3.18 4.64 0.06 
3 82.30 14.09 3.16 0.44 
4 75.30 20.65 3.68 0.35 
5 69.76 26.51 3.26 0.45 
Prices     
1 26.09 73.90 0.00 0.00 
2 24.02 75.89 0.03 0.04 
3 29.59 70.21 0.12 0.06 
4 32.47 67.19 0.11 0.20 
5 35.43 64.20 0.12 0.24 
 
As the interest relies on the impact of shocks in the real exchange rate and slave 
prices in the beef jerky productions, to complement the previous table, graph 6 presents 
results of an Impulse Response Analysis for 10 periods. As slave prices don’t have any 
impact (less than 0.3 percent) on quantity exported and price, we only present the graph 
for the real exchange rate. 
The quantitative analysis presented in this section does not provide evidence that 
the rise in slave prices had a negative impact on the beef jerky production. There was 
some impact on the exchange rate on the quantity of exports but its effect is small and 
cannot be used as an important factor for production stagnation in Rio Grande do Sul.  
 
 
                                                             
11 Also, since we fail to reject that the long term coefficient is different from zero at 95%, it can be stated 
that the RER is long-run exogenous. 
Graph 6: Impulse Response Analysis of LQ to LRER 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 Beef jerky’s production decline was not restricted to Brazil, it was a global 
phenomenon. The end of slavery in several countries across the Americas at the second 
half of the nineteenth century and an increase in wages in Europe’s consumers markets 
led to the consumption of better quality products. Tariff protection and political 
instabilities in Uruguay benefited Rio Grande do Sul beef jerky production until the end 
of the 1860’s, when with the loss of its privileged position it acquired a new market 
share. We provide evidence that differences in labor regimes cannot be accounted for 
the different trajectories in livestock between the regions. We also found that despite 
some effect of real exchange in prices, the effect is too small for being accountable as 
the reason of the sector decline. With the new series on Rio de Janeiro market prices, it 
can be stated that both products had similar prices and different market shares were 
related to product quality and higher productivity in Uruguayan production. 
 With the estimates that wage labor was more expensive, Uruguay also had 
incentives to use more capital intensive production, since its labor costs were higher 
than in Brazil. Therefore, Uruguay cattle industry’s growth came with its diversification 
in exports, especially canned and refrigerated meat. The foreign investment from British 
companies, that made the Uruguayan transition possible, was absent across the border. 
These results indicate that the increase in beef jerky production in Uruguay was 
probably a result from an increase in non salted meat. As happened in the United States, 
the increase in non salted preserved meat led to an increase in cattle stock from which 
inferior pieces were used to produce beef jerky.  
  The international demand, represented by European markets, had changed, and 
Uruguay managed to transform and diversify its industry to meet consumers’ needs. 
Even though it could not face United States meatpacking industry, the Rio do Prata 
region made substantial improvements in the last quarter of nineteenth century. At the 
same time, Rio Grande do Sul industry stagnated: the beef jerky remained crucial to the 
province while it was not anymore for other regions. 
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APPENDIX A: 
 
1 – Heteroscedasticity analysis.  
 
 
 
 Since the series present evidence of heteroskedasticity, we use the logarithm 
transformation. 
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2 – Unit Root Tests. 
 
2.1 - ADF - Dickey e Fuller  
 According to Dickey and Fuller (1981) for a sample size of 50 and probability of 
0,95, the critical values for the constant and trend are, respectively, 3,14 and 2.81. Using 
information criteria (AIC, SIC and HQ) to select the number of lags, table 1 presents the 
statistics for the model with constant and trend, while the third column is for the model 
with only a constant. From these results, the model with constant and trend is not 
appropriate for the variables LQ, LS e LSa, while the model with a constant is not 
appropriate for the variable LS.  
Table 1: Statistics for trend and constant models   
 Statistic  
(trend and constant) 
 Statistic 
(constant) 
LQ @trend 1.009 LQ constant 4.309 
LP @trend -2.923   
LRER @trend -2.814   
LS @trend -1.391 LS constant 2.073 
LSa @trend -1.752 LSa constant 3.345 
 Using these different specifications, the following table presents the ADF unit 
root statistics for the five variables. Since the null hypothesis is for the existence of a 
unit root, we find evidence for a unit root in LRER and LS. The variable LP rejects the 
null at 5 percent but not at 1 percent. The variables LQ and LSA do not present 
evidence of unit roots.    
Table 2: ADF unit root test 
 LQ LP LRER LS LSA 
DF test Statistic -4.221 -3.568 -3.012 -0.040 -3.351 
Critical Value (5%) -2.926 -3.508 -3.508 -1.612 -2.925 
 
2.2 - DF-GLS – Elliott, Rothenberg e Stock  
 Since the inclusion of deterministic terms may result in lower power for the 
ADF statistical test, we use the DF-GLS unit root test. We use this test with the 
variables LQ, LP, LRER and LSA, which have deterministic trends. The number of lags 
were selected based on the SIC criteria. Based on the test results, we find evidence for 
unit roots on the variables LQ, LP and LRER. The variable LSA is stationary. 
 
 
Table 3: DF-GLS Unit Root Test  
 LQ LP LRER LSA 
ERS DF-GLS test statistic -0.855 -3.509 -2.752 -3.122* 
Critical Value (1%) -2.615 -3.770 -3.770 -2.615 
Lag Length (SIC) 1 0 0 0 
 
2.3 - KPSS - Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt e Shin.  
 As a way to verify the previous results, we also use the KPSS unit root test. The 
null hypothesis of this test is that the variable is stationary. To select the model 
specification we use graphical analysis of the variables, presented in table 1. For lag 
selection, we use the Newey-West information criteria with Barlett Kernell as the 
spectral estimation method. The statistic also provides evidence that all variables, 
except LSA, have a unit root. 
Table 4: KPSS unit root test  
 LQ LP LRER LS LSA 
KPSS test stat Const 0.663* 0.720* 0.841* 0.564* 0.336 
Critical Value C (5%) 0.463 0.463 0.463 0.463 0.463 
KPSS test stat Trend 0.190* 0.103 0.095 0.201* 0.109 
Critical Value T (5%) 0.146 0.146 0.146 0.146 0.146 
Bandwidth 5 4 5 4 3 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Variables trends (logs) 
 
 
3 - Lag Criteria for the Vector Error Correction Model: 
 With four variables I(1), the following table shows that one lag is an adequate 
selection for the model.  
Table 5: VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria 
Lag LogL FPE AIC SC HQ 
1  30.50617   5.71e-06* -0.725308  -0.049757*  -0.481050* 
2  46.23700  5.89e-06 -0.711850  0.639254 -0.223334 
3  60.43677  6.81e-06 -0.621838  1.404817  0.110936 
4  74.20539  8.52e-06 -0.510270  2.191938  0.466763 
5  88.04650  1.17e-05 -0.402325  2.975434  0.818966 
6  104.8820  1.59e-05 -0.444102  3.609208  1.021447 
7  113.4825  4.16e-05 -0.074123  4.654739  1.635684 
8  169.1074  1.64e-05  -2.055368*  3.349046 -0.101303 
Sample 1837-1884, 40 observations. Endogenous variables: LQ, LP, LRER, LS. 
3.1 - Johansen Procedure: 
 Based on the previous graphical analysis of the nonstationary variables, we 
assume a model with a constant inside the cointegration vector and another on the VAR. 
Both the trace and maximum eingenvalue statistics  indicate the existence of a 
cointegration vector. 
Table 6: Johansen Cointegration Vector Test 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace) 
Hypothesized 
No. of CE(s) 
Eigenvalue Trace 
Statistic 
Critical Value 
0.05 
Prob. ** 
None * 0.557964 57.88214 47.85613 0.0043 
At most 1 0.228640 20.32945 29.79707 0.4007 
At most 2 0.118850 8.387854 15.49471 0.4249 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
Hypothesized 
No. of CE(s) 
Eigenvalue Max-Eigen 
Statistic 
Critical Value 
0.05 
Prob. ** 
None *  0.557964  37.55269  27.58434  0.0019 
At most 1  0.228640  11.94159  21.13162  0.5534 
At most 2  0.118850  5.820244  14.26460  0.6364 
Sample 1839-1884, 46 observations. Series: LP, LQ, LRER, LS.  
Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend 
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 1 
4 – Residual Test 
 For the residual vector to conform to the assumptions of the model, the residuals 
cannot be autocorrelated and should have a normal distribution. To test for 
autocorrelation, we use the LM test. For the normality hypothesis, we use the Cholesky 
test. The LRER and LS did not have normal residuals due to two outliers. Therefore, we 
use one dummy for the LRER variable for the 1842 and another for the LS variable for 
the year 1883. The null hypothesis for the LM test is no serial correlation at lag order h.   
Table 7: VEC Residual Serial Correlation LM test 
Lags LM-Stat Probability 
1  17.87280  0.3314 
2  19.64557  0.2366 
3  10.52889  0.8376 
4  15.75987  0.4698 
5  11.97683  0.7456 
Sample 1837-1884, 46 observations.  
Table 8: VEC Residual Normality test 
Component Skewness Chi-sq df Probability 
1  0.133134  0.135888 1  0.7124 
2 -0.106905  0.087620 1  0.7672 
3  0.266783  0.545660 1  0.4601 
4 -0.272250  0.568254 1  0.4510 
Joint   1.337423 4  0.8550 
Component Kurtosis Chi-sq df Probability 
1  1.731522  3.083984 1  0.0791 
2  2.208278  1.201412 1  0.2730 
3  1.917748  2.244931 1  0.1341 
4  2.400673  0.688453 1  0.4067 
Joint   7.218780 4  0.1248 
Component Jarque-Bera  df Probability 
1  3.219873  2  0.1999 
2  1.289032  2  0.5249 
3  2.790591  2  0.2478 
4  1.256707  2  0.5335 
Joint  8.556203  8  0.3811 
Sample 1837-1884, 46 observations. Orthogonalization: Cholesky (Lutkepohl).  
H0: residuals are multivariate normal. 
5 – Exogeneity tests  
 
 Since the cointegration coefficient of the variable LS is not different from zero, 
it can be stated that this variable is weakly exogenous. To reinforce this result, the LR 
test is carried out to the relationship between exogeneity and cointegration. 
Table 9: LR Test 
Cointegration Restrictions: A(4,1)=0 (Convergence achieved after 9 iterations) 
LR test for binding restrictions (rank = 1) 
Chi-square(1)  0.193767 
Probability  0.659799 
 The test statistic does not allow the hypothesis, that the LS variable is weakly 
exogenous, to be rejected. Strong exogeneity implies, besides the existence of weak 
exogeneity, that the variable has temporal precedence (Granger causality). From the 
result of the following table, LS is not strong exogenous. 
Table 10: Granger Causality Test 
  Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability 
D(LS) does not Granger Cause D(LQ) 46  0.04937  0.82521 
D(LQ) does not Granger Cause D(LS)   1.8E-07  0.99967 
Lags: 1    
 
 
APPENDIX B: DATA 
Year RER Quantity Prices Slave Prices Salt Prices 
1837 27,30 2601 854,21 400,00 1744 
1838 25,02 2360 681,09 500,16 1689 
1839 29,68 6497 871,23 488,15 1749 
1840 26,49 5959 821,95 453,94 2047 
1841 26,88 8187 904,07 525,67 1673 
1842 38,14 9932 697,61 612,49 1951 
1843 27,60 13910 676,11 699,95 2084 
1844 32,80 11888 676,04 448,74 4354 
1845 31,12 33963 724,30 667,19 2712 
1846 27,76 14496 1942,26 630,15 2404 
1847 33,24 14671 2008,08 750,50 2684 
1848 26,45 13138 1082,96 505,20 2690 
1849 27,58 6318 1094,38 484,47 2604 
1850 28,95 10515 1688,48 426,44 2929 
1851 27,01 12386 1846,00 576,36 3298 
1852 24,34 10541 1596,34 547,02 2757 
1853 21,50 17128 917,63 904,12 2408 
1854 20,82 16387 705,07 946,60 2457 
1855 19,31 16617 712,31 863,84 1878 
1856 18,05 18436 575,77 996,75 1600 
1857 18,52 21930 574,28 1073,51 2631 
1858 17,12 14559 668,22 1152,45 2528 
1859 16,05 25433 191,91 1241,16 2305 
1860 17,38 22808 469,77 1038,67 2991 
1861 19,02 29956 443,47 1075,97 3149 
1862 17,92 28341 346,82 1699,21 2609 
1863 19,99 30171 355,55 1618,79 2754 
1864 16,93 35952 442,69 1254,50 2223 
1865 14,15 31518 271,44 1432,43 1790 
1866 13,32 32532 208,20 1082,60 1616 
1867 13,04 33315 334,69 1178,35 1616 
1868 10,82 43748 250,11 1326,12 1383 
1869 10,80 21406 340,52 1251,33 1817 
1870 10,40 27190 290,46 1202,58 1412 
1871 11,15 16394 582,47 1076,33 1481 
1872 11,80 33513 247,28 1125,64 1741 
1873 11,82 30087 241,77 1154,15 1669 
1874 11,50 22491 236,74 1287,86 3188 
1875 12,21 25937 297,95 1357,02 2257 
1876 10,95 23847 303,69 1762,62 2172 
1877 9,66 29734 261,25 1291,98 1327 
1878 9,92 28005 242,05 1545,01 2145 
1879 9,76 23709 266,80 1163,61 2710 
1880 10,36 24575 321,97 1281,42 2388 
1881 10,36 16818 313,97 996,09 1606 
1882 10,32 19130 238,82 1049,31 1622 
1883 10,46 22925 232,92 461,28 1330 
1884 11,59 22644 221,62 459,51 1454 
 
